

out of the 138, for which a full set of visual acuity (VA) test results was available from before, at the day of, and some time after the incident. VA was tested using Landoldt rings with the results expressed as decimals.

To represent the change of VA over the time period between first examination and day of accident (T1) and the day of accident and post-accident examination (T2), respectively, the intra-eye differences of test results between two points in time as well as the intra-individual change between two eyes were calculated, and a signed-rank test for dependent samples was used for the statistical analysis. To estimate the impact of the accident on VA, a generalized linear model (GLM) was used to adjust for the duration between two tests, considering the biological decline of visual acuity with increasing age and taking into account the intra-individual correlation between left and right eyes.

In addition to the evaluation on group basis we individually reviewed the medical files of persons where a long-term damage could not be ruled out confidently.

Results

Of the 64 cases, 24 involved only the left eye, 14 only the right eye, and in 26 cases both eyes had been affected. Only 2 (3%) of them were female, 50 (78%) were aged over 40 at the time of accident and 46 (72%) had been employed for more than 5 years in BASF. The

duration of T1 varied between 218 and 1847 days, and that of T2 between 707 and 4006 days.

In T1, the injured left eyes had about 19% excess decline of VA, compared to the non-injured right eyes. This effect was independent of time. In T2, the injured left eyes had 13.6% improvement of VA, as compared to the non-injured right eyes. Both differences were statistically significant. Across the whole observation period, the change of VA was attributable to a time effect. The injury did not cause a significant impact on the decline of VA.

The same pattern, although not reaching statistical significance, was observed for the “only right eye” cases. In the sub-group of bilateral injuries, the effect of duration between the VA tests was estimated. Because there was no control, namely no non-injured eye, the effect of duration comprises both the effect of injury and the effect of time. In T1, a significant decline of VA was observed.

In T2, no significant change of VA could be found, although a slight improvement was suggested in comparison with the VA change in T1. Across T1 + T2, an overall decline of VA was observed.

Discussion

The average incidence of 4.8 accidental chemical eye contacts per 1,000 employees

per year corresponds to approximately 1 incident per 344,000 hours worked, and is thus comparatively low in this population. Only a fraction of these incidents required more than the initial treatment, which consisted of immediate flushing with water and, eventually, a second rinsing with NaCl solution on the ambulance car or after arrival at our outpatient clinic. The average decline in visual acuity observed on the day of the accident appeared to be transient. Possibly, the mechanical irritation caused by flushing may have contributed to this finding. An apparent recovery occurred between the day of the accident and the next examination, independent of time. A long-term impact of the injuries on the eyesight of the affected individuals was thus not evident in our data. While these results obtained on group-basis do not rule out a potential benefit from an “optimal therapy” in unfortunate individual cases, the existence of such cases in our population could not be confirmed after individual review of the medical files of persons deemed at special risk for long-term damage.

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**World Health
Organization Issues
Update on H1N1
Pandemic Monitoring**

This article is modified from the WHO Global Alert and Response website page. This Pandemic Update was issued 16 July 2009.

As the 2009 pandemic evolves, the data needed for risk assessment, both within affected countries and at the global level, are also changing.

At this point, further spread of the pandemic, within affected countries and to new countries, is considered inevitable. This assumption is fully backed by experience. The 2009 influenza pandemic has spread internationally with unprecedented speed. In past pandemics, influenza viruses have needed more than six months to spread as widely as the new H1N1 virus has spread in less than six weeks. The increasing number of cases in many countries with sustained community transmission is making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for countries to try and confirm them through laboratory testing. Moreover, the counting of individual cases is now no longer essential in such countries for monitoring either the level or nature of the risk posed by the pandemic virus or to guide implementation of the most appropriate response measures.

Monitoring still needed

This pandemic has been characterized, to date, by the mildness of symptoms in the overwhelming majority of patients, who usually recover, even without medical treatment, within a week of the onset of symptoms. However, there is still an ongoing need in all countries to closely monitor unusual events, such as clusters of cases of severe or fatal pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection, clusters of respiratory illness requiring hospitalization, or unexplained or unusual clinical patterns associated with serious or fatal cases.

Other potential signals of change in the currently prevailing pattern include unexpected, unusual or notable changes in patterns of transmission. Signals to be vigilant for include spikes in rates of absenteeism from schools or workplaces, or a more severe disease pattern, as suggested by, for example, a surge in emergency department visits. In general, indications that health services are having difficulty coping with cases mean that such systems are under stress but they may also be a signal of increasing cases or a more severe clinical picture.

A strategy that concentrates on the detection, laboratory confirmation and investigation of all cases, including those with mild illness, is extremely resource-intensive. In some countries, this strategy is absorbing most national

laboratory and response capacity, leaving little capacity for the monitoring and investigation of severe cases and other exceptional events.

Regular updates on newly affected countries

For all of these reasons, WHO will no longer issue the global tables showing the numbers of confirmed cases for all countries. However, as part of continued efforts to document the global spread of the H1N1 pandemic, regular updates will be provided describing the situation in the newly affected countries. WHO will continue to request that these countries report the first confirmed cases and, as far as feasible, provide weekly aggregated case numbers and descriptive epidemiology of the early cases.

For countries already experiencing community-wide transmission, the focus of surveillance activities will shift to reporting against the established indicators for the monitoring of seasonal influenza activity. Those countries are no longer required to submit regular reports of individual laboratory-confirmed cases to WHO.

Monitoring the virological characteristics of the pandemic virus will be important throughout the pandemic and some countries have well-established laboratory-based surveillance systems in place already for seasonal influenza virus monitoring. Even in

countries with limited laboratory capacity, WHO recommends that the initial virological assessment is followed by the testing of at least 10 samples per week in order to confirm that disease activity is due to the pandemic virus and to monitor changes in the virus that may be important for case management and vaccine development.



Business Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklist

In anticipation of worsening of the influenza pandemic, the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have developed various checklists to assist companies in developing a Business Pandemic Influenza strategy for managing business and workflow in the event of widespread illness. More detailed information can be found at <http://www.pandemicflu.gov/pl/an/workplaceplanning/businesschecklist.html> The information included below has been taken from this website.

The following sections are included in the checklist for the Business Pandemic Influenza Plan. More details can be found at the website above.

- Plan for the impact of a pandemic on your business

- Plan for the impact of a pandemic on your employees and customers
- Establish policies to be implemented during a pandemic
- Allocate resources to protect your employees and customers during a pandemic
- Communicate to and educate your employees
- Coordinate with external organizations and help your community



IARC Monograph 100: A Review of Human Carcinogens

The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has held meetings since October 2008 to re-evaluate new scientific evidence pertaining to substances reviewed in previous IARC Monographs as human carcinogens. Meetings held to date have reviewed pharmaceuticals; biological agents; metals, particles and fibers; radiation; and lifestyle factors.

October 20-27, 2009, the Committee to evaluate Chemical Agents and Related Occupations will meet in Lyon, France. Chemicals and occupations to be considered include: aflatoxins (naturally occurring mixtures); 4-aminobiphenyl; benzene; benzidine; dyes metabolized to benzidine; bis (chloromethyl)

ether and chloromethyl methyl ether (technical grade); 1,3-butadiene; ethylene oxide; formaldehyde; 4-4'-methylene bis (2-chloroaniline) (MOCA); mustard gas (sulfur mustard); 2-naphthylamine; 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-*para*-dioxin; *ortho*-toluidine; vinyl chloride; PAHs and RELATED OCCUPATIONS INCLUDING: benzo[*a*]pyrene; soots; occupational exposures during coal gasification; coal-tars; coke production; paving and roofing with coal-tar pitch; mineral oils, untreated and mildly treated; shale-oils; aluminum production;

OTHER RELATED OCCUPATIONS: auramine production; iron and steel founding; isopropyl alcohol manufacture (strong-acid process); magenta production; occupational exposure as a painter; rubber industry; strong-inorganic-acid mists containing sulfuric acid (occupational exposure).

In 2008, the Advisory Committee to Recommend Priorities for IARC Monographs during 2010-2014 included the following chemicals as HIGH PRIORITIES:

- Acetaldehyde
- Acrylamide and furan
- Asphalt and bitumen
- Carbon-based nanoparticles
- Crystalline fibers other than asbestos
- Growth hormone
- Iron and iron oxides

